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ABSTRACT

1. INTRODUCTION

Human users form coalitions to solve complex tasks and earn
rewards. Examples of such coalition formation can be found in
the military, education, and business domains. Multiagent coalition formation techniques cannot be readily used to form human
coalitions due to the unique aspects of the human coalition formation problem, e.g., uncertainty in human user behavior and
changes in human user behaviors due to human learning. Thus, a
multiagent system designed to form human coalitions has to solve
a learning problem, that is further made difficult by the limited
learning opportunities and usability issues (i.e., actions or decisions being perceived as not useful due to loss of immediate rewards while the agents are learning or exploring) intrinsic to the
human coalition formation process. We propose and design a
multiagent framework that distinguishes the impact of the model
of a human user from that of the agent support for that model.
This novelty allows an agent to (1) better compute the types of
support it should provide to its assigned user and (2) more accurately estimate the value of a coalition by its ability of (a) solving
the current task and (b) improving the coalition members’ behavior due to learning. In our design, each agent models its environment using a Bayesian network and forms human coalitions
for its assigned user using a negotiation-based protocol. Each
coalition balances the immediate and future rewards by analyzing
the benefits of solving tasks and facilitating human learning. To
evaluate the proposed framework, we have built a comprehensive
simulation where agents support students to form coalitions in a
collaborative learning environment. Our results show that the
framework is able to form successful coalitions that facilitate
student learning while solving tasks, leading to overall better rewards for student coalitions.

Human users form coalitions to solve complex tasks and to earn
rewards. Examples of such coalition formation process can be
found in the business (e.g., organizations forming coalitions to
earn better discounts), education (e.g., students forming coalitions
to solve problems and gain knowledge), and in the military (e.g.,
soldiers forming coalitions to complete difficult missions) domains. With the advancements in the computer and communication technologies, human coalitions now span space (members
spread across the globe), and time (group members communicating asynchronously). Although human coalitions are becoming
common in various domains, achieving optimal outcome in a
human coalition is not automatic and depends on three aspects: (1)
the coalition structure, (2) the uncertainty in the environment, and
(3) changes in human behavior. The coalition structure defines
the distribution of the human users of different skills to the coalitions; the uncertainty in the environment and in the human user
behavior determines how they use those skills; and changes in
human behavior are due to how human skills improve due to
learning.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial Intelligence:
Multiagent systems, intelligent agents.

General Terms
Algorithms, Design, Experimentation, Human Factors.

Keywords
Multiagent, Coalition Formation, Human Coalition Formation,
Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning.
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Multiagent researchers have designed frameworks where agents
take the uncertainty in the environment and the changes in other
agents’ behavior into account and generate coalition structures.
However, those multiagent coalition formation methods cannot be
readily used to form human coalitions for three reasons: (1) human changes due to learning, (2) short- and long-term rewards,
and (3) human user modeling:
 Since humans learn, a multiagent solution for the human coalition formation problem (HCFP) must consider two issues. First,
the skills and experience gained by a human user while working
in a coalition can help him or her perform tasks better—and thus
obtain higher rewards—in future coalitions. So, the agents that
are helping the human users form coalitions need to model their
own human users’ as well as the other human users’ learning to
accurately estimate the outcome of a coalition. Second, the agents
helping the human users form coalitions can provide support to
the human users and exploit the human users’ learning capability
to further improve the outcomes of a coalition. So, while forming
coalitions, the agents also need to contemplate the support that
they provide to the human users to more accurately estimate the
value of a coalition in terms of its outcome.
 Furthermore, the rewards of a typical HCFP can be of two
types: current-task and future-task rewards. The complications lie
with the future-task or the long-term rewards. In a multiagent
system (MAS), long-term rewards are often calculated as discounted short-term rewards (e.g., [1]). However, in a HCFP,
long-term rewards typically depend upon factors such as the
openness—how often the tasks and users change in the environment—and how fast or how well the human users are able to ac-

quire new skills through learning. So, computing long-term rewards in a HCFP will need to consider these factors integrally.
 Finally, unlike conventional multiagent systems, the actors of
the human coalition formation problem are human users (not
agents). The implication is that the actors in the human coalition
formation problem may not always behave rationally or consistently. So, a MAS that forms human coalitions must model such
uncertainty regarding human user behaviors while reasoning to
form coalitions.
In this paper, to solve a HCFP, we propose a multiagent framework called Multiagent Human Coalition Formation (MHCF). In
this framework, agents work as assistants to the human users and
help them form coalitions and solve assigned tasks to earn rewards. The strength of our novel approach lies in our combined
use of multiagent and generic human-behavior-related knowledge
to address the aforementioned key issues (i.e., human type transformation due to learning, reward structures, and user modeling).
Briefly, first, MHCF agents address the type transformation issue
by considering (1) the agent support, (2) the model of the assigned
human user, and (2) the change in that model due to his or her
learning, when estimating the value of a human coalition. The
agents address the reward structure issue by using a probabilistic
model of the environment that take the openness of the system
and the learning of the human users into account to estimate the
future-task rewards. Finally, the agents address the user modeling
issue by cooperatively learning a probabilistic model of its assigned human users and the dynamics of the environment, where
the cooperative learning enables the user agents to (1) better estimate the uncertain behavior of his or her assigned human user and
(2) learn about the environment dynamics faster. To investigate
the effectiveness of the MHCF framework, we have used it to
form student coalitions in SimCoL (designed by [4]) —a simulation of students and computer-based scaffolding in a computersupported collaborative learning environment. Our results show
that the framework is able to form successful coalitions that facilitate student learning while solving tasks, leading to overall better
rewards for student coalitions.

2. Human Coalition Formation
2.1 Basic Assumptions and Definitions
Reflecting on the human coalition formation problem (HFCP), we
have the following basic Assumptions: (1) (Task) There is a set of
tasks in the environment that the human users in the environment
can solve to earn rewards; (2) (Coalitions) The human users can
form disjoint coalitions to earn rewards; (3) (Behavior) The solution of each task requires a coalitional action which is composed
of a series of individual actions from the members of the formed
coalition; (4) (Learning) The human users participating in the
task solving activities of their respective coalitions are capable of
learning from their experiences and improving their behavior, (5)
(Uncertainty) The behaviors of the human users, i.e., their individual actions, in a coalition cannot be accurately modeled, and
can only be modeled probabilistically; and (6) (Reward) The
rewards achievable by a human coalition are of: (1) current-task
(short-term) rewards and (2) future-task (long-term) rewards.
Further, the current-task reward is a human user’s share in the
coalitional reward his or her coalition has earned by solving an
assigned task and can be exactly calculated as soon as the coalition completes the assigned task. The future-task reward is an
estimation of the current-task rewards of the future tasks that is
expected to be available as a human improves as he or she learns.

Definition 1 (Human Coalition Formation Problem) Given a set
of human users and a set of tasks, the human coalition formation
problem (HCFP) refers to the division of that set of human users
into disjoint groups in such a way that the division optimizes the
current-task rewards of all the human users over the entire set of
tasks. Since at any given time, the set of future tasks and the set
of human users in the environment are not necessarily known, the
core of HCFP lies at the tradeoff between maximizing currenttask rewards and maximizing future-task rewards when forming
the coalitions.

2.2 Environment
In this section, we further define the environment through a set of
assumptions, which are essential in addressing the unique challenges involving human coalition formation. We also define
agent support, a novel component in a MAS where human users
and user agents co-exist. With this definition, it allows us to consider the impact and cost of agent support to address user needs.
Assumption 7 (Environment) The MHCF environment 𝐸 =
𝐻, 𝑈, 𝑇, 𝐴𝑐 , 𝑆, 𝐸𝑉𝑀 consists of a set of human users 𝐻 =
1 , … , 𝑛 , a set of user agents 𝑈 = 𝑢1 , … , 𝑢𝑛 , a set of tasks
𝑇 = 𝑇1 , … , 𝑇𝑛𝑡 , a finite set of human user actions 𝐴𝑐 that are
required to solve the tasks, a system agent 𝑆 that conducts the
assignment of tasks and distributes rewards, and an evaluation
metric function in the form 𝐸𝑉𝑀: 𝑇𝑗 × 𝛼 → 𝑅 where 𝛼 ⊆ 𝐴𝑐 and
𝑅 ∈ ℝ.
Assumption 8 (Task) The tasks in the MHCF environment are
denoted by: 𝑇𝑗 = 𝑠𝑡𝑗 , 𝑡𝑙𝑗 , 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑗 , 𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑗 , where 𝑠𝑡𝑗 is the time the
coalition can start working on the task, 𝑡𝑙𝑗 is the time limit within
which the coalition must complete the task, 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑗 is the actionset(s)
required to solve this task, and 𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑗 ⊆ 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑗 is the task actionset(s)
that are required and completed. The required actionsets also
identify the type of a task. Furthermore, we define the degree of
type similarity between two tasks 𝑇𝑗 and 𝑇𝑘 as: 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑡𝑎𝑐 𝑇𝑗 , 𝑇𝑘 =
1 − 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑗 \𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 + 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 \𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑗
𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑗 + 𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 (1)
According to Eq. 1, the similarity between the types of two tasks
is equal to the ratio of the number of required actionsets that are
common between them (calculated by taking the set difference
operator \) and the total number of required actionsets they have.
Assumption 9 (Assistant) Each user agent 𝑢𝑖 in the MHCF environment is assigned to a human user 𝑖 to help that human user
form coalitions and earn rewards.
Assumption 10 (Modeling) Each user agent 𝑢𝑖 maintains a model
𝑖
𝑚𝑖,𝑡
of its assigned human user 𝑖 and maintains a vector of
models 𝒉𝒎𝑖𝑠,𝑡 of a subset of human users 𝐻𝑠 ⊆ 𝐻. A human user
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
model 𝑚𝑖,𝑡
is a tuple of attributes 𝑎𝑖,𝑡,1
, … , 𝑎𝑖,𝑡,𝑛𝑎
where
𝑖
𝑎𝑖,𝑡,𝑘 ∈ 𝐻𝑎 ∀𝑘.
Assumption 11 (Coalition) A coalition 𝐶 = 𝐻𝑐 , 𝑈𝑐 , 𝛼𝑐 , 𝒅𝑐 , 𝑔 is
defined as a five-tuple containing a set of human users 𝐻𝑐 , their
respectively assigned user agents 𝑈𝑐 , a joint coalitional actionset
𝛼𝑐 = 𝛼𝑖 , … , 𝛼𝑘 for individual actions 𝛼𝑖 agreed to be performed
by human users 𝑖 ∀𝛼𝑖 ∈ 𝛼𝑐 and ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐻𝑐 , and a demand vector
𝒅𝑐 = 𝑑1 , … , 𝑑𝑛𝑑 consisting of agreed demands of the reward
which is available upon completing the joint coalitional actionset
𝛼𝑐 . The goal of the members of a coalition is to perform the joint
coalitional actionset 𝛼𝑐 = 𝛼1 , … , 𝛼𝑛𝑐 where 𝛼𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝑐 ∀ 𝑖 to receive coalitional reward 𝐸𝑉𝑀 𝑇𝑐 , 𝛼𝑐 = 𝑅𝑐 . This coalitional

reward is then divided proportionally among the members: 𝑅𝑖 =
𝑅𝑐 ⋅ 𝑑𝑖 𝑑 𝑖 ∈𝐷𝑐 𝑑𝑖 where 𝑑𝑖 and 𝑅𝑖 are the demand and the individual current-task reward of human user 𝑖 for the task 𝑇𝑐 . Finally, 𝑔 is a group agent—its role to be specified in Section 2.4—that
helps the user agents learn.
Assumption 12 (Time) We assume that the agents’ and human
users’ actions occur in discrete time quanta 𝑡𝐸 = 𝑡0 , … , 𝑡∞ . Furthermore, we assume that the tasks are assigned to the coalitions
in a time line τT = 𝜏0 , … , 𝜏𝑛𝑡 . At any point of time 𝜏𝑖 there is a
subset of tasks 𝑇𝜏𝑖 where 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑡𝑎𝑐 𝑇𝑗 , 𝑇𝑘 > 0 ∀ 𝑇𝑗 , 𝑇𝑘 ∈ 𝑇𝜏𝑖 . That
means, at any given point of time, there are single instances of
multiple tasks available for the human coalitions to solve. In this
environment, each user agent tries to optimize the rewards for its
assigned human user by finding the most reward-yielding task and
the most reward-yielding human coalition for that task.
Definition 2 (Agent Support) We define agent support or scaffolding provided by a user agent 𝑢𝑖 to its assigned human user 𝑖
𝑖
as a function 𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑚𝑖,𝑡
, 𝛼𝑖 = 𝑔𝑐𝑡1 , … , 𝑔𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐 where 𝑔𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∈
𝑆𝐶 ∀𝑖 while 𝑖 is working in a coalition 𝐶, having agreed to perform action 𝛼𝑖 where the user agent 𝑢𝑖 supports its human user
accordingly with action 𝑔𝑐𝑡𝑖 . We define the cost of scaffolding
𝑖
as: 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑚𝑖,𝑡
, 𝛼𝑐 ∈ ℝ. Furthermore, we define the set of
scaffolding provided by the user agents in a coalition 𝐶 as:
𝑖
𝑆𝐶𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑚𝑖,𝑡
, 𝛼𝑖 |∀𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 .
Assumption 13 (State) The states of the MHCF environment are
denoted by 𝜔 = 𝐶𝑆, 𝑇𝐶𝑆 , 𝒅𝐶𝑆 , 𝜶𝐶𝑆 , 𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆 . Here 𝐶𝑆 is the coalition structure, 𝑇𝐶𝑆 ⊆ 𝑇 is the set of tasks assigned to the coalitions
𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝑆, 𝒅𝐶𝑆 is the vector of demand vectors of the coalitions
𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝑆, 𝜶𝐶𝑆 is the vector of joint coalitional actionsets being
carried out in coalitions 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝑆, and 𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆 is the set of scaffolding
actions of the user agents 𝑢𝑖 ’s working in the coalitions 𝐶 ∈ 𝐶𝑆.
Furthermore, a state at time 𝑡 is defined by:
𝜔𝑡 = 𝐶𝑆𝑡 , 𝑇𝐶𝑆,𝑡 , 𝒅𝐶𝑆,𝑡 , 𝜶𝐶𝑆,𝑡 , 𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆,𝑡 .
Assumption 14 (Observable State) We assume that each agent is
able to obtain only a partial view of the environment—
specifically, it is able to obtain information regarding its own
coalitions. The states of the MHCF environment that are observable by a user agent 𝑢𝑖 at time 𝑡 are denoted by 𝜔𝑡𝑖 =
𝐶𝑡 , 𝑇𝑐,𝑡 , 𝒅𝑐,𝑡 , 𝛼𝑐,𝑡 , 𝑆𝐶𝑐,𝑡 . Here 𝐶𝑡 is the coalition, 𝑇𝐶,𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 is the
set of assigned tasks, 𝒅𝐶,𝑡 is the demand vector, 𝛼𝐶,𝑡 is the joint
coalitional actionset being carried out, and 𝑆𝐶𝐶,𝑡 is the set of scaffolding actions of the user agents in the coalition 𝐶𝑡 . at time 𝑡.

2.3 Problem Definition
Definition 3 (The Multiagent Human Coalition Formation
(MHCF)
Problem):
Given
the
environment
𝐸 = 𝐻, 𝑈, 𝑇, 𝐴𝑐 , 𝑆, 𝐸𝑉𝑀 , the MHCF problem refers to a partition
of the set of human users into coalitions that optimizes the total
reward earned by the human users over a set of tasks ,
𝑡∈𝜏 𝑇

max𝐶𝑆

 𝑖 ∈𝐶𝑡 ∈𝐶𝑆𝑡

𝑅𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 (2)

where 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 is the reward of human user 𝑖 while working in the
coalition 𝐶𝑡 to solve task 𝑇𝑗 at time 𝑡. Solving this problem faces
several challenges. First, the total number of coalitions possible
for a set of human users 𝐻 is 2𝐻 . Therefore, finding the coalition
structure that optimizes the total reward of the set of human users
will be a computationally intractable problem [13]. Second, since

the real-world systems are often open, it will be a waste of resources to compute the optimally rewarding coalitional structure
for the entire set of tasks since the set of human users and the
available tasks could change over time. Third, since human behavior changes over time, we argue that by making sequentially
rational [2] decisions in forming coalitions, it is possible to
achieve near optimal rewards for the human users over an entire
set of tasks. Finally, due to uncertainty in modeling the human
user behavior, it may not be possible to calculate the coalition
structure that would maximize the reward of all the human users
for any task.
Therefore, instead of finding an algorithm that achieves this goal
of the human coalition formation problem but may be difficult to
implement in a real-world system due to high computational complexity, we propose a modified version of the multiagent human
coalition formation problem in which the individual agents try to
make sequentially rational [2] decisions over a set of tasks to
allow its assigned human user to join the highest-reward-yielding
coalitions based on the information available to it during that
round of coalition formation.
Definition 4 (Multiagent Human Coalition Formation Problem
for Individual Agents) In the environment 𝐸 =
𝐻, 𝑈, 𝑇, 𝑆, 𝐸𝑉𝑀 , the multiagent human coalition formation problem (from the perspective of an individual user agent 𝑢𝑖 ) refers to
finding a 𝐶, identifying the necessary scaffolding 𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑚𝑖𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖 ,
and when considering action 𝛼𝑖 at any state 𝜔𝑡𝑖 such that, the sum
of the expected reward for joining the coalition for the current
task 𝑇𝑗 starting at time 𝜏𝑗 minus the cost of scaffolding the human
user for the current task is maximized. This can be written as:
max𝐶 max𝛼 𝑖 max𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 ,𝜏𝑗 +𝑡𝑙𝑗 𝜔𝑡𝑖

(3)

where, the total expected reward 𝑅𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 ′ 𝜔𝑡𝑖 at some state 𝜔𝑡𝑖 is
defined as:
𝑅𝑖,𝑗 ,𝜏𝑗 +𝑡𝑙𝑗 𝜔𝑡𝑖 = 𝑅𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝜏𝑗 +𝑡𝑙𝑗 𝜔𝑡𝑖 +
𝑖
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑚𝑖,𝑡
, 𝛼𝑖

𝑡 ′ ,𝑇𝑘 ⊆𝑇 𝑅𝑓𝑡𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 ′

𝜔𝑡𝑖 −

(4)

where 𝑡 ′ = 𝜏𝑘 + 𝑡𝑙𝑘 , 𝑅𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝜏𝑗 +𝑡𝑙𝑗 𝜔𝑡𝑖 is the expected current-task
reward of the human user 𝑖 for task 𝑇𝑗 assigned at time 𝜏𝑗 and
whose reward is available at time 𝜏𝑗 + 𝑡𝑙𝑗 . Furthermore,
𝑅𝑓𝑡𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 ′ 𝜔𝑡𝑖 is the expected future-task reward for future tasks 𝑇𝑘
that would be available to the human coalitions at time 𝜏𝑘 and
whose reward would be available at time 𝑡 ′ ∈ 𝜏 𝑇 + 𝑡𝑙𝑘 . Finally,
𝑖
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑚𝑖,𝑡
, 𝛼𝑖 is the cost incurred by the user agent 𝑢𝑖 for
providing scaffolding to the human user 𝑖 for contributing individual action 𝛼𝑖 to the joint coalitional action 𝛼𝑐 .

3 Design of the MHCF Framework
Here we describe two key components of the MHCF framework:
negotiation and learning. The agents use negotiation to form coalitions. Each agent also learns the model of its assigned human
user and those of other relevant human users, and the probabilities
for the impact of agent-provided scaffolding.

3.1 Coalition Formation by Negotiation
Our proposed negotiation-based coalition formation method consists of three main stages: initialization, negotiation, and finalization.

Stage 1 (Initialization) In the initialization stage, the system
agent communicates with all the user agents and announces the
tasks the human users need to complete in the upcoming round of
coalition formation.
Stage 2 (Negotiation) The negotiation is a three-step process that
is carried out in rounds. These steps are: proposition, consideration, and notification. Next we describe these steps in details.
1. Proposition: We assume that at the beginning of the negotiation process, each user agent is in a singleton coalition. Then at
each round of the negotiation process, one agent is randomly selected (with equal probability) to be a proposer who acts as the
initiator of the negotiation process Once the negotiation process
starts, the chosen proposer agent has the following options: (1) it
can choose to stay in its own coalition with everything unchanged,
i.e., relinquish its turn, (2) it can propose to modify its own coalition with a renewed demand, and (3) it can propose to form a new
coalition with a new proposal with a new set of coalition members
and a new demand. In our negotiation protocol, we assume that
all agents, even those that have already formed a coalition, participate throughout the entire negotiation period. Furthermore, some
agents may be in a singleton coalition during the negotiation
rounds and it may take several rounds of negotiation for some
agents to give up its singleton coalition and join some other large
coalition. Finally, the proposer proposes to all of its potential
coalition members at the same time. The proposal of a user agent
is defined as the following:
Definition 5 (Proposal) The proposal of a user agent 𝑢𝑖 to user
agent 𝑢𝑗 at time 𝑡 is a 5-tuple 𝑝𝑠𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝒉𝒎𝑖𝑐,𝑡 , 𝑑𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝛼𝑖 ∈
𝑖
𝛼𝑐 , 𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑚𝑖,𝑡
, 𝛼𝑖 made by 𝑢𝑖 to form coalition 𝐶𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝑆𝑡 , 𝒉𝒎𝑖𝑐,𝑡
as the vector of human user models (without user agent/human
user identities) that will be in the proposed coalition as viewed by
user agent 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑑𝑗 ,𝑡 as the demand of reward for 𝑗 determined by
𝑢𝑖 ―on behalf of‖ 𝑢𝑗 respectively, 𝛼𝑐 as the joint coalitional actionset of the coalition 𝐶𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝑆𝑡 in which 𝛼𝑖 is the action that 𝑖 is
𝑖
going to contribute to the coalition, and 𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑚𝑖,𝑡
, 𝛼𝑖 is the scaffolding provided by 𝑢𝑖 for its assigned human user 𝑖 with user
𝑖
model 𝑚𝑖,𝑡
.
Definition 6 (Value of a Coalition) The value of a coalition from
the perspective of an agent 𝑢𝑖 assigned to human user 𝑖 is:
max𝛼 ∈𝐴𝑐

𝑉𝑡𝑖 𝐶𝑡 |𝒉𝒎𝑖𝑐,𝑡 =
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑡∈𝜏,𝑇𝑗 ∈𝑇 Pr 𝛼𝑐 |𝒉𝒎𝑐,𝑡 , 𝑆𝐶𝑐,𝑡 Pr 𝜔𝑡 |𝛼𝑐 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 𝜔𝑡

(5)

So, the value of a coalition is the maximum sum of the expected
reward it can generate over all future states in which task reward
can be collected. The value of the expected reward is calculated
by multiplying: (1) the probability of performing joint coalitional
actionset for a given vector of human user models and the scaffolding agreed upon by the user agents to be provided to that
group, (2) the probability of reaching a state after taking a joint
coalitional actionset, and (3) the total reward available to the user
agent at that state.
Furthermore, the proposer’s choice of the demand (or offer from
the proposer’s perspective) for the responder, i.e., 𝑑𝑗 , depends on
the proposer agent’s estimate of the value of the human user
represented by the responder in the coalition, and is calculated as
the following.

Definition 7 (Value of a Human User) The value of a human user
𝑗 in the coalition 𝐶𝑡 as calculated by the user agent 𝑢𝑖 as:
𝑉𝑡𝑖 𝑚𝑗𝑖,𝑡 |𝐶𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡𝑖 𝐶𝑡 |𝒉𝒎𝑖𝑐,𝑡 − 𝑉𝑡𝑖 𝐶𝑡 |𝒉𝒎𝑖𝑐\  𝑗
𝑉𝑡𝑖

𝐶𝑡 |𝒉𝒎𝑖𝑐,𝑡

,𝑡

/

(6)

So, the value of the human user in the coalition is found by calculating the difference between the value of the coalition with that
human user and the value of the coalition without that human user
and then dividing that difference with the value of the whole coalition.
Assumption 15 (Reward Valuation) The human users are heterogeneous with respect to their valuation of current-task and futuretask.
Definition 8 (Total Reward) The total reward for joining a coalition from the perspective of an agent 𝑢𝑖 assigned to human user 𝑖
for solving some task 𝑇𝑗 in a coalition 𝐶 is:
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑅𝑖,𝑗
,𝑡 𝜔𝑡 = 𝑣𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 𝜔𝑡 ⋅ 𝑅𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 𝜔𝑡 + 𝑣𝑓𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 𝜔𝑡 ⋅
𝑖
𝑖
𝑅𝑓𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 𝜔𝑡 (7)

According to Eq. 7, the total reward available to a human user at a
state is the sum of current-task and future-task rewards weighted
by its human user’s valuations of those rewards.
Furthermore, the current-task reward in Eq. 7 is calculated as,
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑅𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗
,𝑡 𝜔𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖 ⋅ 𝑅𝑐𝑡𝑐 𝜔𝑡 /

 𝑖 ∈𝐻𝑐

𝑑𝑖 (8)

where 𝑑𝑖 ∈ 𝒅𝑐 is the demand of the human user 𝑖 (Assumption
11) for the coalitional reward. So, a human user’s share of the
current-task reward is calculated by dividing his or her demand
with the total demand of the entire coalition which the coalition
members agreed upon (Assumption 11) during the negotiation
stage. Next, the future-task reward is defined as:

𝑇𝑗 ∈𝑇,𝑡 ′′ >𝑡 ′ >𝑡∈𝜏

Pr

𝑖
𝑖
𝑅𝑓𝑡𝑖,𝑗
,𝑡 𝜔𝑡 =
𝑖
𝑖
𝑚′ 𝑖,𝑡 ′ |𝜔𝜏𝑖 𝑗 Pr 𝜔𝑡𝑖 ′′ |𝑚′ 𝑖,𝑡 ′

𝑖
𝑖
𝑅𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑗
,𝑡 𝜔𝑡 ′′ (9)

Here, the future-task reward is calculated by multiplying: (1) the
probability of the model of its human user being changed in state
𝜔𝜏𝑖 𝑗 after completing the current task, (2) the probability of reaching future states due to that changed human user model, and (3)
the current-task rewards. The inspiration of describing the futuretask reward using Eq. 7 comes from Assumptions 3 and 4. We
assume that human users are able to learn from their experiences
of working in coalitions and are able to modify their behavior
(e.g., acquire new capabilities) as a result of that learning. This
future-task reward is designed to estimate how much reward in
future a human user may earn from his or her experience of working in this coalition.
2. Consideration: Once approached by a proposer in the proposition stage, the responding agent has three types of replies: (1)
accept the proposal as is, (2) reject the proposal outright, and (3)
provide a counter-proposal to the proposer agent with the same
coalition members but with an increased demand for itself.
The criterion for accepting a proposal is the following. A responding agent would only accept a proposal iff the value of the
proposed coalition (Eq. 5) is strictly greater than the value of its
current coalition. In other words, a responding agent 𝑢𝑗 currently

in the coalition 𝐶𝑡 would switch coalition for a new proposal
𝑖
𝑝𝑠𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 = 𝑖𝑑𝑖 , 𝒉𝒎𝑖𝑐 ′ ,𝑡 , 𝑑𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝛼𝑖 ∈ 𝛼𝑐 , 𝑠𝑐𝑖 𝑚𝑖,𝑡
, 𝛼𝑖
iff
𝑉𝑡

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝑗

𝐶𝑡′ |𝒉𝒎𝑐 ′,𝑡 > 𝑉𝑡 𝐶𝑡 |𝒉𝒎𝑐,𝑡 .

𝑗

𝑖
𝑀𝐷 𝑚𝑖,𝑡
, 𝑚𝑖,𝑡 =

𝑖=1,…, 𝑚 𝑖𝑖

𝑗

𝑗

𝑖
𝑤𝑖 ⋅ 𝐶𝐷 𝑎𝑖,𝑡
, 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 (11)

𝑗

where, 𝐶𝐷 𝑎𝑖𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 ∝ 𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖 denotes the difference between the attribute values modeled by the user agents 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝑗 ,
𝑗

If the responding user agent decides to revise the proposal, it will
send out a counter-proposal to the proposer agent. We define the
counter-proposal as the following:

i.e., difference between the values of 𝑎𝑖𝑖 and 𝑎𝑖 and 𝑤𝑖 s are
weights since not all attribute difference would impact the performance of the human user in a coalition in the same way.

Definition 9 (Counter-Proposal) The counter-proposal of a user
𝑗
agent 𝑢𝑗 to user agent 𝑢𝑖 is a 4-tuple 𝑝𝑠𝑗′ ,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝑑𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝛼𝑗 ∈

Once the model is updated, the proposer agent would accept the
counter-proposal 𝑝𝑠𝑗′ ,𝑖,𝑡 and revise its own proposal 𝑝𝑠𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 , iff,

𝑗

𝛼𝑐 , 𝑠𝑐𝑗 𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝛼𝑗 , 𝑝𝑠𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 0 made by 𝑢𝑗 to revise the proposal posted by 𝑢𝑖 to form coalition 𝐶𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝑆𝑡 , 𝑑𝑗 as the demand of reward
for 𝑗 determined by 𝑢𝑗 . Notice that this new demand 𝑑𝑗 ,𝑡 ∝
𝑗

𝑗

𝑉𝑡 𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡 |𝐶𝑡 is calculated by the responding agent using Eq. 6.
Furthermore, 𝛼𝑐 is the joint coalitional actionset of the coalition
𝐶𝑡 ∈ 𝐶𝑆𝑡 , 𝛼𝑗 is the human user 𝑗 ’s contribution to the joint coali𝑗

tional actionset 𝛼𝑐 , 𝑠𝑐𝑗 𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡 , 𝛼𝑗 is the scaffolding provided by
the user agent 𝑢𝑗 to its assigned human user 𝑗 , and 𝑝𝑠𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡 0 is the
original proposal put forth by the user agent 𝑢𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑜 < 𝑡.
3. Notification: Once the proposer agent receives the counterproposal, it first updates its own model of the human user
represented by the responding agent from the information in the
counter-proposal using the following formula.
𝑎𝑗𝑖,𝑡,𝑘

← 𝑤𝑜 ⋅

𝑎𝑗𝑖,𝑡,𝑘

+

𝑗
𝑤𝑛 ⋅ 𝑎𝑗 ,𝑡,𝑘
𝑖
𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡 (10)

𝑤𝑜 + 𝑤𝑛

∀𝑎𝑗𝑖,𝑡,𝑘

∈

Notice that in Eq. 10, the proposer updates each attribute of its
assigned human user by finding an weighted average of the: (1)
the old value calculated by the proposer and (2) the new value
described by the responder. This model exchange acts as a learning mechanism for all negotiating agents allowing them to update
their models of the human users they would like to form coalitions
with. Furthermore, the weights allow the proposer to balance the
emphasis on its own model of a human user and the modeling of
that human user by the responder agent. According to Assumption
4, the model of a human user changes over time due to his or her
learning as he or she participates in joint coalitional actions. Furthermore, we assume that the user agents are able to observe the
actions and behavior of the human users in its own coalition only.
As a result, one of the two following situations may occur: (1) the
proposer’s assigned human user may not have ever been in a coalition with the responder’s human user, i.e., the proposer does not
have a model of the responder’s human user; or (2) the proposer
has an outdated model of a responder’s human user.
Once the model is updated, the proposer has the following options: (1) accept the counter-proposal or (2) reject the counterproposal. Whether the proposer accepts the counter-proposal
depends on: (1) the discrepancy between the proposer and the
responding agent’s model of the responding agent’s assigned hu𝑗
man user (i.e., the difference between 𝑚𝑗𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑚𝑗 ,𝑡 ) and (2) the
human users represented by the user agent in the coalition. We
define the discrepancy between the models of a human user prepared by two different user agents as:
Definition 10 (Model Discrepancy) The discrepancy between the
models of a human user 𝑖 as prepared by the two different user
agents 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝑗 is:

𝑉𝑡𝑖 𝑚𝑗𝑖,𝑡 |𝐶𝑡 > 𝑑𝑗 ,𝑡

 𝑖 ∈𝐶 𝑑𝑖

∈ 𝑝𝑠𝑗′ ,𝑖,𝑡 (11)

In Eq. 11, 𝑉𝑡𝑖 𝑚𝑗𝑖,𝑡 |𝐶𝑡 is calculated using Eq. 6. So, according
to our reasoning, the responding agent’s revised demand would be
accepted by the proposer if that updated demand is less than the
responding user agent’s value in the coalition calculated with the
proposer’s updated model.
Once the proposer agent accepts or rejects the counter-proposal, it
will communicate its decision to the responding agent and complete the negotiation round. If all of the user agents to whom the
proposer proposed to, agrees to join its coalition, the proposer
then forms the coalition and sends out the coalition formation
message: 𝑀𝑐𝑓 = 𝒉𝒎𝑖𝑐,𝑡 , 𝒅𝑐 , 𝛼𝑐 to all of the proposed user agents.
Stage 3 (Finalization) In the finalization stage, the system agent
signals the user agents to stop the negotiation rounds and assigns
tasks to the formed coalitions. Once the tasks are assigned, the
proposer agents send out a coalition revelation message: 𝑀𝑖𝑟 =
𝑈𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖 |𝑖 ∈ 𝐻𝑐 , 𝛼𝑖 ∈ 𝛼𝑐 which reveals the identity of
the members of the coalition (i.e., 𝑈𝑖 s) and the task assignments
(i.e., 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖 ) to the member user agents.

3.2 Learning for Coalition Formation
The learning aspect of the MHCF framework is complex. First,
the human users learn from their experience working in coalitions.
Second, the agents learn about modeling their human users more
accurately. Driving an agent’s learning is its goal of selecting the
right coalition, identifying the right task, and providing the right
scaffolding for its assigned human user to achieve maximum total
reward (per Def. 4, Eq.3):
Definition 11 (Learning Goal) The learning goal of an agent in
the MHCF environment consists of (1) learning the model of its
assigned human user, (2) learning the models of a subset of other
human users with which its assigned human user may form coalition, and (3) learning the probabilities that capture the impact on
the model (or type) of a human user due to the user-agentprovided scaffolding on: (a) completing the current task and earning current-task rewards and (b) improving the human user’s
model by learning and earning future-task rewards.
Our solution to the learning problem utilizes both model-based
and cooperative (or divided [3] ) learning. Using the model-based
learning, the user agents learn the values of the different attributes
of a given model of its assigned human user and the other human
users in the MHCF environment through interactions. Each user
agent, based on its own experience and through experience sharing with other agents, learn a model of the environment that (1)
describes the generic dynamics of a human coalition formation
environment and (2) links the task and the human user’s models
with their rewards (both current-task and future-task ones).

Learning Assigned Human User’s Model.
Assumption 16 (Learning Attribute Values through Observation) The user agents are able to observe/learn the current state of
its assigned human user’s model periodically. For example, these
observations can be in the form of psychometric tests or surveys
that are performed by the user agents on their human users.
Assumption 17 (Finite Attribute Categorization) Each attribute
regarding the human user behavior can be divided into a finite set
of categories.
Here, finite attribute categorization (which is common in various
psychometric tests) allows the user agents to overcome the socalled continuous state problem because, when every attribute in
the human user model is divided into a finite set of categories, the
total number of observable states (Assumption 14) for the user
agents is reduced to a significantly smaller finite number. This
reduction of the total number of observable states helps the user
agent learn the probability values in the environment better which
in turn helps their reasoning process while forming coalitions.
Learning Other Human Users’ Models. As discussed earlier,
the user agents have to learn other potential human user’s models
and they have to update those learned models since a user agent is
able to observe only its assigned human user’s model (Assumption
16). One way the user agents can learn the models of a subset of
other human users is through the negotiation process. Notice that
during the counter-proposal stage (Section 2.4) of the negotiation
process, the responder provides the user agent an updated model
of its assigned human user. Using this negotiation mechanism,
the proposer agents can update their models of the subset of potential coalition members when those members’ user agents act as
the responders in the negotiation process.
Learning the Probabilistic Model of the Environment. In a
way, the user agents learn the probabilistic model of the MHCF
environment so that the user agents share the burden of learning
among themselves. With this approach of cooperative learning,
two questions arise: (1) how is the probabilistic model regarding
the MHCF environment represented by individual agents? and (2)
how do the agents share their learned probability values with each
other? For modeling the probabilities of the environment, the user
agents use Bayesian networks, and for sharing the learned probability values, the user agents use group-agent-mediated cooperative learning. A Bayesian network (BN) is a triplet 𝑉, 𝐺, ℘
where 𝑉 is a set of variables, 𝐺 is a connected DAG whose nodes
correspond one-to-one to members of 𝑉 such that each variable is
conditionally independent of its non-descendants given its parents, and ℘ is a set of probability distributions. Say the parent of
nodes 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 is denoted by 𝜋 𝑣 , then, ℘ = 𝑃 𝑣|𝜋 𝑣 |∀𝑣 ∈ 𝑉
(15) and 𝑃 𝑉 = Π𝑣∈𝑉 𝑃 𝑣|𝜋 𝑣 (16). Figure 1 shows the BN
structure of the MHCF environment as used by the user agents.
Fig. 1 shows the nodes and the edges that represent the generic
structure of the BNs that is used by the user agents in the MHCF
environment. Notice that Fig. 1 describes the BN of user agent 𝑢𝑖
𝑖
who is assigned to human user 𝑖 with model 𝑚𝑖,𝑡
working in
coalition 𝐶 with other human users with model 𝒉𝒎𝑖𝑐,𝑡 where the
user agents in the group are providing scaffolding 𝑆𝐶𝑐,𝑡 . The BN
in Fig. 1 would allow the user agents to determine, probabilities
like Pr

𝛼𝑐 |𝒉𝒎𝑖𝑐,𝑡 , 𝑆𝐶𝑐,𝑡

(Eq. 5, 6) and Pr

𝑖
𝑚′ 𝑖,𝑡 ′ |𝜔𝜏𝑖 𝑗

(Eq. 7, 9).

Fig. 1: Descriptive BN Structure of the MHCF Environment
Group-Agent-Mediated Cooperative Learning of BN. We use
group agents to mediate cooperative learning within each coalition
of agents. While the human users in a coalition are working, the
user agents observe the actions of their assigned human users and
update their own BNs. When the coalition’s task is over and the
rewards are distributed, the user agents upload their own BNs to
the group agent assigned to their respective groups. Once the
group agents have collected the BN from their user agents, they
communicate among themselves and use the BN-Update algorithm (communication complexity 𝑂(𝑛𝑔 )), as shown in Table 1, to
create an updated BN. The group agents then send the updated
BN to each of the user agents in their group. Finally, the user
agents combine the updated BN with their existing BN probability
values to update their own BNs.
Note that with the above cooperative learning mechanism, there
are the following advantages: (1) the user agents need to communicate only twice with the group agents, (2) the user agents have
to reveal only a small subset of probabilities to the group agents,
and (3) given a heterogeneous environment with different types of
human users, tasks, and scaffolding, the user agents are able to
learn the probabilities faster and more accurately together than
they would have learned individually.
Table 1: BN-Update for Group Agent 𝒈𝒊
BN-Update for Group Agent 𝒈𝒊
1. Initialize: 𝑃 ← 𝜙, 𝑃𝑢 ← 𝜙, 𝑃𝑜 ← 𝜙
2.Collect BN probability set 𝑃 = 𝑃𝑖 , … , 𝑃𝑘 from user agents
𝑢𝑖 , … , 𝑢𝑘 ∈ 𝐺𝑖
3.Unify the collected probabilities: 𝑃𝑢 ← 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑦𝐵𝑁 𝑃
4.If received probability 𝑃𝑜′ from group agent 𝐺𝑜
𝑃𝑜 ← 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑁 𝑃𝑜 , 𝑃𝑜′
5.If available, collect BN token and group agent list
𝐺𝑐 = 𝑔1 , … , 𝑔𝑘
a. For each group agent 𝐺𝑐 = 𝑔1 , … , 𝑔𝑘 , Send 𝑃𝑢
b. Send BN token and 𝐺𝑐 \ 𝑔𝑘 , 𝑔𝑖 to 𝑔𝑘
6. Else If received BN token and group agent list 𝐺𝑐 from 𝑔𝑘+1
a. For each group agent 𝐺𝑐 = 𝑔1 , … , 𝑔𝑘 , Send 𝑃𝑢
b. Send BN token and 𝐺𝑐 \ 𝑔𝑘 to 𝑔𝑘
7. Update BN probability using 𝑃𝑜 ← 𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑁 𝑃𝑢 , 𝑃𝑜
8. Send BN probability set 𝑃𝑜 to user agents 𝑢𝑖 , … , 𝑢𝑘
The key functions in Table 1 can be defined as follows:
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑦𝐵𝑁 𝑃𝑜 , 𝑃𝑜′
=

∀𝑃𝑖 ∈𝑃 𝛾𝑖

⋅ Pr𝑖 𝑥|𝑦, 𝑧 /

𝑖 𝛾𝑖

∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝐵𝑁 (17)

where 𝛾𝑖 is the number of observations that occurred in the group
agent 𝑔𝑖 ’s group (i.e., the group agent 𝑔𝑖 ’s confidence on the cal-

culated probability) and Pr𝑖 𝑥|𝑦, 𝑧 are the various probabilities
measured by the user agents 𝑢𝑖 ∈ 𝐺𝑖 \ 𝑢𝑖 .
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑁 𝑃𝑜 , 𝑃𝑜′
= Pr𝑜 𝑥|𝑦, 𝑧 + Pr𝑜′ 𝑥|𝑦, 𝑧

/2 ∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝐵𝑁 (18)

Pro′

where
𝑥|𝑦, 𝑧 are the various probabilities measured by the
user agents 𝑢𝑜 ∈ 𝐺𝑖 \ 𝑢𝑖
𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑁 𝑃𝑢 , 𝑃𝑜 =
γ ⋅ Pr𝑢 𝑥|𝑦, 𝑧 + 1 − γ Pr𝑜 𝑥|𝑦, 𝑧

/2 ∀𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝐵𝑁 (19)

3.3 Novelty of MHCF Design
The novelty of the MHCF framework lies in the design of its negotiation protocol and learning strategy. First, our design of the
negotiation protocol allows the user agents to balance the currenttask (estimated from their model) and future-task rewards (estimated from their model and the support of their agents) while
forming coalitions. This novel design allows the user agents to
exploit the learning capability of the human users to form coalitions that improves the model of human users while solving the
current task. Second, unlike the typical multiagent coalition formation protocols, the negotiation protocol in MHCF allows the
user agents to take the agent scaffolding into account while estimating the value of a human user or a coalition. This aspect of
the design of the negotiation protocol allows the user agents to:
(1) improve the current-task and future-task rewards of its assigned human user by capitalizing on the human learning and (2)
more accurately judge the value of a coalition by considering the
scaffolding provided by the agents of other human users, and (3)
reason by balancing the cost and benefit of providing the scaffolding to the human users. Finally, the probabilistic calculation of
the current-task reward and future-task reward allows the user
agents to incorporate the openness of the environment and the
learning capability of human users of different models to better
estimate the value of a human user and that or a coalition.
Second, the novelty in the learning process of the user agents in
the MHCF environment lies in the following. First, a model-based
cooperative learning strategy allows the user agents to estimate
the values of a human user and a coalition more accurately and at
a faster rate than that of a regular reinforcement learning strategy.
Second, the design of our model-based learning allows the user
agents to take three important elements: (1) the model of a human
user, (2) the support provided by his or her user agent, and (3) the
models and the scaffolding of his or her group members into account while calculating the current-task and future-task rewards of
a human coalition. Since the typical multiagent framework does
not consider these three elements, it would be difficult for their
agents to accurately estimate the short-term and long-term rewards available for a human user in a coalition.
Due to these novel approaches, the MHCF framework is better
suited to solve the problem of forming human coalitions than are
the typical multiagent coalition formation frameworks.

4. IMPLEMENTATION
To test the effectiveness of using MHCF in forming human coalition, we have adopted SimCoL [4]—a multiagent application for
simulating the collaborative learning of a set of students in the
Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL) environment. SimCoL contains agents that act as the students collaborating in a CSCL classroom and an agent who act as the teacher of
that classroom. In our implementation of MHCF in SimCoL, we

have added agents to provide support to: (1) the students (student
agents), (2) the teacher (teacher agent), and (3) the groups (group
agents). In our implementation: (1) the student agents in SimCoL
act as the user agents, (2) the teacher agent in SimCoL acts as the
system agent, and (3) the group agent acts as the group agent.
The tasks in SimCoL are typical classroom problems that contain
several subtasks and those subtasks have difficulty values assigned by the teacher. Each student in SimCoL has a model that
contains: knowledge, ability, motivation, emotion, and social
relationship with others. The student agents in MHCF used the
ability (calculated in SimCoL using knowledge, motivation, and
emotion) and social-relationship of the students to build the student model. Furthermore, we have provided BN (like Fig. 1) to
the student agents in SimCoL which contains the probability values they exchange with other student agents. Equipped with the
student models and the BN, the student agents negotiate with
other student agents to choose a subtask that is suitable for their
assigned students. Once the coalitions are formed, the students in
SimCoL collaborate with their peers to solve their assigned subtasks while the student agents monitor their activities and provide
task-dependent scaffolding. This scaffolding improves the recipient student’s expertise and helps him or her solve the assigned
subtask better. When the collaborative session is over, the teacher
agent rewards each student a score that is proportional to the sum
of the difficulty of the assigned subtask and the final solution
quality of that subtask.

5. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
To test the effectiveness of MHCF framework, we have randomly
generated 99 student models in SimCoL and 50 tasks where each
task contained 3 different subtasks. Furthermore, < 50% of the
total set of subtasks contained similar concepts and were randomly distributed (not known to the student agents forming the coalitions) among the 50 tasks. Then MHCF framework was used to
form three-member coalitions for each task and the students collaborated to solve the task and earn rewards. We had two main
foci of our investigation: first, we investigated the ability of the
MHCF framework of forming student coalitions that are able to
collaborate and earn rewards in the environment. Second, we
investigated the MHCF framework’s ability to exploit human
learning and improve the total reward over the entire set of tasks.
Fig.2 shows the average knowledge gain of the students for the 50
tasks they solved.

Fig. 2: Average Knowledge Gain over Time
The trend in Fig. 2 shows that over time, the students were able to
gain more knowledge per classroom session. Furthermore, a similar trend is observed when the total reward earned by the students
is plotted against the number of tasks completed. The outcome of
the student coalitions consists of the knowledge and reward gain
of the students. Furthermore, the setup of SimCoL dictates that
student coalitions may gain knowledge and earn rewards when
their members have high ability difference and high social relationship values. When this is not the case, the collaboration

process among the members may break down and they may fail to
earn reward or gain knowledge. So, our results imply that the
MHCF framework was able to form student coalitions that lead to
successful collaborations and the entire set of students were able
to improve their knowledge and earn reward while solving the
assigned tasks.
We also investigated the MHCF framework’s ability to exploit the
student learning to improve the total rewards earned over the entire set of tasks. The results show that over time: (1) the standard
deviation of the rewards earned by the student coalitions decreased (slope = −0.22, 𝑝 < 0.01) and (2) the reward earned per
interaction increased (slope = 1.56, 𝑝 < 0.01). The reward (i.e.,
the score) of a student is proportional to the sum of (1) the difficulty of the subtask and (2) the solution quality achieved by the
students who are solving it. Since the student agents in our implementation try to improve the total reward earned over the entire
set of tasks, initially, some of the coalitions will contain students
who may fail to attain high solution quality for the subtasks since
they or their peers would have low ability. As a result, the members of those coalitions would have low rewards yielding (1)
higher standard deviation of rewards and (2) low reward per interaction value for the entire classroom respectively. However, that
tradeoff would improve the total reward earned by the entire
classroom for future tasks since the members of those coalitions
have improved their abilities and can now utilize that learned skill
to earn better rewards. As a result, there would be fewer coalitions with low rewards and (1) the standard deviation of the
earned reward would decrease and (2) the reward gain per interaction would increase, as indicated by the observed slopes above.
To further validate the MHCF framework’s ability of improving
the total reward over time, we have replicated the same experiment with randomly formed coalitions. The statistically significant results of our comparison experiment shows that (1) MHCFformed coalitions earn more rewards (𝑝 < 0.01) over time, (2)
MHCF-formed coalitions reduce the standard deviation of the
earned reward faster (slope −0.22 vs. 0.01, 𝑝 < 0.01), and (3)
MHCF-formed coalitions improve the reward per interaction
faster (slope 1.56 vs. −1.96, 𝑝 < 0.01).
In summary, our analysis of the results indicate that the MHCF
framework is able to form student coalitions in such a way that the
members of those coalitions achieve better rewards over time
while solving the current task. Further, the MHCF framework is
able to exploit the learning ability of the participating students and
improve their total reward earned over a period of time.

6. RELATED WORK
Although most the typical multiagent coalition formation frameworks do not explicitly discuss human coalition formation problems, some of the researchers have discussed forming coalitions in
the real-world uncertain environments which is relevant to the
human coalition formation problem environment. Chalkiadakis
and Boutilier [1] describe a negotiation-based algorithm and
Bayesian learning to form agent coalitions in uncertain environments. Their research is very relevant to ours since it describes
the coalition formation process where agents lack sufficient knowledge of the capabilities of their partner agents and the value of
the coalitions is not known with certainty. In another research,
Kraus, Shehory, and Taase [5] describe a negotiation-based coalition formation protocol for forming agent coalitions in real world
uncertain environments. In their research, agents use simple heu-

ristics to negotiate coalitions that allows them to solve complex
tasks in the business domain under time constraints. However, the
coalition formation methods described these research approaches
are designed to be used in scenarios where the principal actors
(i.e., who solve the tasks) are agents and these methodologies do
not address the unique aspects of the human coalition formation
problem. For example, these coalition formation methodologies
are not designed to exploit the behavioral improvement of the
coalition members and coalition formation methodologies do not
calculate the long-term rewards as a function of the environment
both of which are common in human coalitions. Finally, these
coalition formation methods do not consider the agent support to
the actors while forming the coalitions which could be an important factor in determining the short-term and long-term rewards in
a human coalition formation problem.

7. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have described the design and implementation of
MHCF, a multiagent framework that considers comprehensively
(1) the roles of coalition structures and agent-provided scaffolding
in facilitating human learning, and (2) the tradeoffs between maximizing current-task and future-tasks rewards taking into account
environment openness and human changes, to form human coalitions. In our MHCF design, each human user is assigned a user
agent that conducts negotiations and cooperative agent learning to
form human coalitions. To validate the MHCF framework, we
have used it to form coalitions in SimCoL, an environment that
simulates the collaborative learning activities of students. Our
results show that the agents in the MHCF framework can: (1)
learn to form better coalitions over time and (2) enable the students to earn better rewards for a given set of tasks.
The problem of forming human coalitions is a relatively new research arena and there are a lot of open issues to address. Our
future work includes: (1) improving the MHCF framework by
implementing adaptive scaffolding and incorporating the cost of
scaffolding and (2) conducting a large-scale real-world classroom
experiment with the MHCF framework.
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